| FEDERALIST No. 1 |
General Introduction HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 2 |
Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and
Influence JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 3 |
Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and
Influence (con't) JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 4 |
Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and
Influence (con't) JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 5 |
Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and
Influence (con't) JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 6 |
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between
the States HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 7 |
Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between
the States (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 8 |
The Consequences of Hostilities Between
the States HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 9 |
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic
Faction and Insurrection HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 10 |
The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic
Faction and Insurrection (con't) MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 11 |
The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial
Relations and a Navy HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 12 |
The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 13 |
Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy
in Government HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 14 |
Objections to the Proposed Constitution
From Extent of Territory Answered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 23 |
The Necessity of a Government as Energetic
as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 24 |
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense
Further Considered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 25 |
The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense
Further Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 26 |
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative
Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 27 |
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative
Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 28 |
The Idea of Restraining the Legislative
Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 29 |
Concerning the Militia HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 30 |
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 31 |
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
(con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 32 |
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
(con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 33 |
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
(con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 34 |
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
(con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 35 |
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
(con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 36 |
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
(con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 37 |
Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention
in Devising a Proper Form of Government MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 38 |
The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence
of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 39 |
The Conformity of the Plan to Republican
Principles MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 40 |
The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed
Government Examined and Sustained MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 41 |
General View of the Powers Conferred by
The Constitution MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 42 |
The Powers Conferred by the Constitution
Further Considered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 43 |
The Powers Conferred by the Constitution
Further Considered (con't) MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 44 |
Restrictions on the Authority of the Several
States MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 45 |
The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the
Union to the State Governments Considered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 46 |
The Influence of the State and Federal Governments
Compared MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 47 |
The Particular Structure of the New Government
and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 48 |
These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated
as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 49 |
Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments
of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through
a Convention HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 50 |
Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 51 |
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish
the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments HAMILTON
OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 52 |
The House of Representatives HAMILTON OR
MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 53 |
The House of Representatives (con't) HAMILTON
OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 54 |
The Apportionment of Members Among the States
HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 55 |
The Total Number of the House of Representatives
HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 56 |
The Total Number of the House of Representatives
(con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 57 |
The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to
Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with
Representation HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 58 |
Objection That The Number of Members Will
Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 59 |
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate
the Election of Members HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 60 |
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate
the Election of Members (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 61 |
Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate
the Election of Members (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 62 |
The Senate HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 63 |
The Senate (con't) HAMILTON OR MADISON |
| FEDERALIST No. 64 |
The Powers of the Senate JAY |
| FEDERALIST No. 65 |
The Powers of the Senate (con't) HAMILTON |
| FEDERALIST No. 66 |
Objections to the Power of the Senate To
Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered HAMILTON |